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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court act within its discretion in dis-
missing a paternity action for failure to join as indispensable 
parties, the child, the mother of the child, and husband of the 
mother at the time the child was born? 
2. Whether the State, after intervening in a divorce action 
to establish the rights and duties with regard to custody, visita-
tion and suppport of a minor child, is now bound by collateral es-
toppel or res judicata from pursuing Defendant with respect to 
support of the minor child. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a paternity action involving the child support obli-
gation to Keith Douglas Sandoval who was born on the 16th day of 
July, 1978 to Barbara Sandoval. At the time of the birth Barbara 
Sandoval was married to Kenneth Joseph Sandoval, having been 
married on March 3, 1978. Kenneth Joseph Sandoval was listed on 
the child's birth certificate as his father. Mr. and Mrs. Sando-
val were divorced September of 1981, pursuant to an amended com-
plaint for divorce prepared by Appellant as an intervener. In 
this Amended Complaint, the Appellant prayed for an order to es-
tablish the rights and duties with regard to the custody, visita-
tion and support of the minor child Keith Douglas Sandoval. In 
accordance therewith Kenneth Joseph Sandoval received responsi-
bility for child support and also child visitation rights. 
In the present paternity action, the State of Utah is the 
only Plaintiff and Respondent is the only Defendant. At the com-
mencement of trial Respondent made a motion to dismiss for failure 
to join an indispensable party and a motion to dismiss based on 
the res judicata/collateral estoppel issues raised by the divorce 
proceeding. At the conclusion of the trial the Court ruled on the 
motion, dismissing the paternity action for failure to join an as 
indispensable party and res judicata/collateral estoppel grounds. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court had broad discretion to dismiss an action for 
failure to join an indispensable party. The State is estopped 
from pursuing Defendant in this paternity action by their actions 
in purportedly establishing the rights and duties with regard to 
the support of Keith Douglas Sandoval in the divorce action. 
ARGUMENT 
Argument I: Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides that a party may move to dismiss for failure to join 
an indispensable party at trial. Respondent's motion to dismiss 
which was made at the outset of the trial was timely. In a case 
where a motion to dismiss was denied the Court said: 
"the trial court properly refused to dis-
miss the action when Defendant's asserted, 
for the first time, the defense of failure 
to join indispensable party, at the trial, 
on the merits. Under Rule 12(h), Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure, when this defense is as-
serted at trial, shall be disposed of as 
provided in Rule 15(b), in the light of any 
evidence that may have been received. At the 
trial, Defendants did not adduce evidence 
sufficient to establish an identifying in-
terest on the part of the alleged "indis-
pensable party" so as to require joinder 
under Rule 19(a) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure." Papanikolis Bros. Enterprises 
vs. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Asso. 5 35 
P2d 1256 (Utah 1975) ." 
While the Court, in this case, upheld the lower courts deci-
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sion to not dismiss, they indicated that dismissal would be proper 
where an "identifying interest" on the part of the alleged indis-
pensable party was established. The interests of the Appellant, 
Barbara Sandoval and Keith Douglas Sandoval are all the same in 
this action. Namely, getting child support for Keith Sandoval. 
Without joining them in this action there is a risk of duplicative 
and inconsistent judgments against Defendant. Kenneth Joseph San-
doval, who was married to Barbara Sandoval at the time of the 
birth and was listed as father on the birth certificate and who 
acted as Keith's putative father for two years and who was awarded 
reasonable and generous rights of visitation in his divorce from 
Barbara, is a party without whom complete relief cannot be accor-
ded as to Respondent. The Court has discretion to proceed with an 
action pursuant to Rule 19(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
without the presence of such a person. This implies the Court 
also has the discretion to not proceed and may dismiss the action 
as the Court did in this case. 
The core of the States interest in this action is to find 
liability on the part of Respondent for child support payments to 
Keith Sandoval. Barbara Sandoval and Keith Sandoval have an iden-
tical interest and should have been joined as indispensable 
parties. Kenneth Joseph Sandoval, being the husband of Barbara 
Sandoval at the time of birth of Keith Sandoval is a potentially 
liable person, and should have been joined as a person without 
whom complete relief could not be accorded. In either instance 
the trial court had the discretion to not permit the case to go 
forward without joinder. The discretion of the trial court was 
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properly exercised and the courts ruling should not be reversed. 
Argument II: The Sandoval's divorce action was commenced 
by Barbara Sandoval filing a complaint against Kenneth Sandoval. 
Later, because the State of Utah was providing assistance to 
Barbara Sandoval, the State intervened and was joined as a Plain-
tiff. One consequence of this joinder was that the State prepared 
an amended divorce complaint which prayed for the establishment of 
the rights and duties with regard to the custody, visitation and 
support of the minor child Keith Douglas Sandoval. In this 
action, Kenneth Sandoval consented to a Default Divorce wherein he 
assured a support obligation for Keith Sandoval. Appellant as-
serts that the support obligation was only for the period during 
which Kenneth and Barbara Sandoval were married. The Divorce 
Decree also grants Kenneth Sandoval "generous" prospective rights 
of visitation. If, as Appellant asserts, Mr. Sandoval's support 
of obligation was limited to the period of the marriage, Mr. San-
doval was accorded the rights of a father without the support ob-
ligations. Respondent was not a party to that divorce action and 
had no part in the Appellant's failure to pursue Kenneth Sandoval 
to the full extent of the law. Sec. 30-1-17.7 of the Utah Code 
states that "the children born to the parties at the date of the 
marriage, shall be deemed the legitimate children of both of the 
parties for all purposes". Emphasis added. The assignment of a 
child support obligation would be a purpose within the meaning of 
this statute. The Appellants, in their brief have indicated that 
the Lord Mansfield Rule that spouses may not give testimony which 
would illegitamize a child born during their marriage has been 
-4-
eliminated by Rule 601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This is 
simply not the case. In the case of Lopes vs. Lopes 518 P2d 687 
(Utah 1974) , the court held that the Lord Mansfield Rule existed 
in spite of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which was the 
predecessor of the current Rule 601. The Lord Mansfield Rule has 
been cited as the controlling law more recently in Roods vs. Roods 
645 P2d 640 (Utah, 1982) and Teece vs. Teece 715 P2d 106 (Utah 
1986). In light of the presumption that Keith Sandoval was the 
child of Barbara and Kenneth Sandoval and that the Sandovals were 
prohibited from giving testimony that would rebutt that presump-
tion, the State was obligated to more actively pursue Kenneth 
Sandoval for a support obligation to Keith Sandoval. The main 
reason for the State's involvement in the Sandoval's divorce 
action was to get a child support order. This is supported by the 
State's motion to amend the complaint in the Sandoval divorce, 
wherein Appellant asked for leave to amend because "the original 
complaint filed by Plaintiff, Barbara Sandoval, does not fully or 
adequately plead matters relating to child support of the minor 
child Keith Douglas Sandoval, born during the marriage of the 
parties on July 16, 1978." Appellants motion to amend the com-
plaint and the subsequent amended complaint prepared by Appellant 
clearly puts the matter of child support for Keith Sandoval in 
issue. 
Once the issue of the welfare of a child has been raised, the 
issue must be fully litigated in the action. 
Plaintiff cites several cases suggesting the 
proposition that a husband and wife have the 
right to contract between themselves and to 
settle and adjust all of their property rights, 
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and Courts have no right to disregard them. 
Citations omitted. These cases, however, are 
relevant only to alimony and support and main-
tenance of the wife. Defendant correctly points 
out that once the issue of the welfare of the 
child has been submitted to the Courts juris-
diction, the Court shall make orders requisite 
to that welfare, including provisions for the 
monetary support of the child, E.C.S. vs. J.D.L. 
529 S.W.2d 423, 427 (MO. 1975). 
Having entered into the lawsuit to litigate the child 
support, the State incurred an obligation to carry that issue to 
its completion. The ongoing support obligation for Keith Sandoval 
was an issue necessary to be litigated in the Sandoval divorce 
action. 
Appellants in their brief cite Searle Bros, vs Searle 583 P2d 
689 (Utah 1978), to establish the four criteria to determine 
whether a party is collaterally estopped from litigating an issue. 
These criteria are that (1) the same issue be involved, (2) the 
judgment be a final judgment, (3) that the claim of collateral 
estoppel be made against a party or someone in privity with the 
party in the prior action and (4) the issue must have been com-
pletely, fully and fairly litigated. 
In the instant case, these criteria have been met sufficient 
to collaterally estopp Appellant from maintaining this action 
against Respondent. The issue litigated in the prior divorce 
action and which Appellant is attempting to litigate in this 
action is the support obligation for Keith Sandoval. The Sandoval 
divorce was negotiated with the result that Kenneth Sandoval con-
sented to a default which culminated in a divorce decree which is 
a final judgment. The Respondent asserted below a plea of col-
lateral estoppel against Appellant who was a party in the Sandoval 
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divorce action. Whether the issue of child support for Keith 
Sandoval was completely, fully and fairly litigated is mainly of 
the concern of Appellant who entered the Sandoval divorce action 
with the major purpose of litigating that issue. 
Having forced themselves into the action, the State was 
clearly in control of the aspects of the action that concerned it. 
By consenting to the divorce decree which did not provide for 
prospective support for Keith Sandoval, the State has waived any 
claim that the issue was not completely, fully or fairly 
litigated. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
ruling of the trial court below in dismissing the action for fail-
ure to join an indispensable party and further affirm the court's 
determination that Appellant is prevented from pursuing this 
action by the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata. 
DATED this 2^Q day of May, 1987. 
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